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Effect of catastrophic disaster in financial market 
contagion
Md. Noman Siddikee1* and Mohammad Mafizur Rahman2
Abstract: The study examined the contagion effect of financial market volatility 
from Australian capital market to Indian, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Chinese, Taiwan, 
and Japanese capital markets due to Australian catastrophe. In the first stage, we 
employed two-variable vector autoregression (VAR) model for calculating the re-
siduals of the daily index return. In the second stage, we used adjusted correlation 
coefficient for detecting the significant increase in correlation coefficient of the VAR 
residuals after the catastrophes. Finally, Fishers r to z transformation was used for 
identifying contagion. After Victoria bushfire, a significant increase in the adjusted 
correlation coefficient of Australia with India and Hong Kong and their respective 
z > +1.96 validates contagion. The adjusted correlation coefficient of Australia with 
China and Japan increased after the Victoria bushfire but the z < +1.96 with (p > 0.05) 
does not confirm contagion, but rather exposed the persistence of high economic 
linkage. Apart from this, a significant decrease in the correlation coefficients with 
New Zealand is evident with corresponding z < −1.96 and (p < 0.05) advocates low 
economic linkage among them. After New South Wales (NSW) bushfire, contagion 
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persists only between Australia and Hong Kong and the economic linkage of Australia 
and Taiwan has notably increased. The negative z score with (p > 0.05) confirms ab-
sence of contagion effect in New Zealand, India, and Japan after shocks. The findings 
of the study recommend the Hong Kong and Indian investors to carefully examine 
the catastrophe-sensitive industry before taking major investment decisions.
Subjects: Environment & Agriculture; Environmental Studies & Management; Development 
Studies, Environment, Social Work, Urban Studies; Economics, Finance, Business & Industry
Keywords: financial market volatility; contagion; environmental catastrophe
JEL classifications: C01; E44; G15
1. Introduction
Australia has a long history of natural disaster, and in recent times, due to climate change and in-
crease in global temperature, catastrophic disasters are very frequent in the country. During the last 
decade, Australia has witnessed a huge number of natural disasters like Storm, Tornado, Cyclone, 
Earthquake, Bushfire, and Floods. The Victoria Bushfire (2009) also named as Black Saturday bush-
fire, New South Wales (NSW) bushfires (2013) and recent Western Australian bushfire (2014) draw 
the attention of today’s economists and policy-makers as they have long-term adverse impact on 
the economy. The average annual cost of natural disaster in Australia was $1.2 billion per year from 
2000 to 2012 and the highest cost ($5.23 billion) was incurred in 2011 (Deloitte, 2013). The costs of 
Australian natural disaster are continuously increasing due to the advanced reporting system and 
increasing number of population at vulnerable areas in recent times. In 2015, total economic cost of 
natural disaster had crossed AU$9 billion in Australia which is equivalent to 0.60% of its GDP and 
expected to be doubled in 2030. Besides, it is argued that economic costs of disasters are approxi-
mately underestimated by 50% in Australia (Deloitte, 2016).
Impact of natural disaster can be classified into two categories, economic and financial. Economic 
loss includes tangible impact which is directly countable like value of infrastructure, vehicles and loss 
of production. Intangible impact includes cost of death, injury and stress associated with the death 
and sickness. Financial loss of natural disaster only accounts direct financial loss of individual and 
enterprise where market price of assets is the mode of cost–benefit analysis (Worthington, 2008). 
Environmental shocks have sector-sensitive influence to the stock market return of Australia 
(Worthington & Valadkhani, 2005) where bushfires, cyclone and earthquakes have major adverse im-
pact to the market return compared to storm and flood (Worthington & Valadkhani, 2004). Australia 
is the 13th largest economy in the world according to nominal GDP in 2015 with the 7th highest per 
capita GDP in 2015 (International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook, 2015). Any economic 
movements of Australian capital market simultaneously impact its partner countries’ economies too.
Australian capital markets are diversely connected with many capital markets due to globaliza-
tion. Unanticipated transmission of shocks among the stock markets of other countries may take 
place due to contagion. Contagion is a cross-border spillover effect of financial shocks. According to 
Forbes and Rigobon (2001), when shocks of one market rapidly transmit to other markets and cor-
relation increase significantly, contagion persists there. However, they also note that if the correla-
tion between two countries is high before the transmission of shocks and remains the same or 
slightly increases but does not changes significantly after the transmission of shocks, this is not 
necessarily a contagion; rather, high economic linkage prevails between the countries. The World 
Bank (2009) classifies contagion into three categories. Firstly, cross-country transmission of shocks 
can occur in real, economic or any other form which may relate to the crisis period but not necessar-
ily always. Secondly, contagion is defined as the existence of significant co-movement of correlation 
after controlling the impact of any cross-border common shocks. Finally, cross-country correlation 
increases in crisis period compared to relatively stable period which may not comply with any under-
lying economic theory.
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After any disaster, researchers mainly concentrate on causes and direct physical losses of the 
disaster. Most of those research works are in the fields of social and environmental sciences. 
Researches regarding the long-term impact on the economy, especially the impact on capital mar-
kets, are fairly limited. Some studies tried to explore the relationship between natural disaster and 
economic growth (see, for example, Benson & Clay, 2004; Cavallo & Noy, 2010; Kim, 2011; Wang & 
Kutan, 2013). Some studies tried to examine the linkage between natural disaster and capital mar-
ket movement (see, Luo, 2012; Worthington, 2008; Worthington & Valadkhani, 2004) and some 
studies tried to examine the contagion effect in other market due to economic and financial shocks 
(see, Chiang, Jeon, & Li, 2007; Forbes & Rigobon, 2002; Khan & Park, 2009; Palamalai, Kalaivani, & 
Devakumar, 2013), but there is no study which examines the impact of natural disaster to the global 
markets. All those studies concentrate on different natural disasters of the world irrespective of 
country-specific consideration. Only Worthington (2008) studied the impact of natural disaster on 
the Australian capital market return. However, this study is not sufficient enough to explore the total 
impact of natural disaster in the Australian capital market except viewing a path of new research 
about the disaster impact across regions, sectors, industries, and companies. Our study is an exten-
sion of Worthington and Valadkhani’s idea adding contagion effect of catastrophic shocks in other 
capital markets and this is the first work of contagion of catastrophic shocks, to the best of our 
knowledge.
The aim of this study is to investigate the impact of Victoria and NSW bushfires in the market vola-
tility of the Australian equity market and the persistence of volatility transmission from Australian 
equity market to the sample countries’ capital market.
2. Catastrophic disaster and international markets
Worthington and Valadkhani (2004) find that bushfires have significant positive impact on the capi-
tal market return of Australia while cyclones have considerable negative impact on the market re-
turn. Besides, earthquake has mixed impact overall. The impact of bushfire is positive to the equity 
market return during the event day or exactly after four days of the disaster. On the other hand, 
cyclones have significant negative impact on the second and fifth days of the disaster, when return 
falls 25% more on the fifth day compared to the second day. The immediate impact of earthquake 
is negative on equity market return but it increases positively (60%) after five days. The findings of 
Ferreira and Karali (2015) suggest that catastrophic disaster does not have any significant impact on 
market volatility except Japan because some selected macroeconomic indicators worked as a me-
diator for controlling the effect of the disaster. This finding is somewhat contradictory with Luo 
(2012) who studied the impact of earthquake to the six major stock markets of Japan and surpris-
ingly found the overall impact of earthquake is small and insignificant in all markets. However, they 
also recognized some specific shocks have both positive and negative effects depending on the 
shock-sensitive industries which partially acknowledge Ferreira and Karali’s (2015) findings too. 
Wang and Kutan (2013) also agreed with Luo (2012) and conclude that natural disaster does not 
affect the composite stock market in Japan and USA but it significantly affects their insurance sec-
tor. They also exposed a positive wealth effect in Japan and a negative wealth effect in the USA.
Investors of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and American Stock Exchange AMEX (organized 
exchange) show insignificant response to the catastrophic disaster news compared to the investors 
of NASDAQ (over the counter market) who are quiet sensitive about disasters information (Thompson, 
Zaman, & Kirmani, 1994). A noteworthy negative abnormal return just before and immediate after 
the disaster was also found. Since all those markets are semi-strong form efficient, it is required to 
have information effect on the share price, but surprisingly the organized exchange like NYSE and 
AMEX’s response to the catastrophic disasters is not complying with the market efficiency rule. 
These findings are approximately similar to the findings of Taimur and Khan (2015) who exhibit ca-
tastrophe events of 1, 5, and 10 days long do not affect the mean return of Karachi stock exchange 
(KSE); however, 15-day long events affect the mean return of KSE which also entails the absence of 
semi-strong form market efficiency at KSE.
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3. Event, data, and estimation methods
Australia is the shocks generating country and ASX300 (for the NSW bushfire) and ASX200 (for 
Victoria bushfire) are the base market indexes in our study. ASX300 is the newest index and gives 
wide exposure of Australian equity markets (approximately 73% of market capitalization, as of April, 
2016). This index was introduced in 2013, so we choose it for examining the NSW bushfire impact. 
We set 7 February 2009 for the Victoria bushfire and 17 October 2013 for the NSW bushfire as disas-
ter events because these are the most recent environmental catastrophes in Australia. Next, we 
examine the transmission of these shocks to the capital markets of New Zealand (NZX), India (BSE), 
China (SSE), Hong Kong (HENGSENG), Taiwan (TSEC), and Japan (NIKKE) as these countries’ capital 
markets are highly connected with the Australian capital markets. We have collected daily stock 
index value of the respective country. All the data are collected from the respective stock exchange 
websites.
For estimation purpose, we calculate the logarithmic market return of each index using the for-
mula r
t
= log (p
t
∕p
t−1) where pt is today’s prices and (pt − 1) is yesterday’s price. The samples are 
then divided into prior and post-shocks return for the both (Victoria and NSW) bushfires. Prior shocks 
data consist of the daily market return from 1 June 2008 to 6 February 2009 for the Victoria bushfire 
and from 1 January 2013 to 15 October 2013 for the NSW bushfire. The post-shocks data include the 
daily market return from 15 February 2009 to 30 August 2009 for the Victoria bushfire and from 21 
Figure 1. Daily log return of 
prior and post-Victoria bushfire.
Note: Prior shocks sample 
consists of 176-day return and 
post-shocks sample consists 
of 224-day return for Victoria 
bushfire.
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Figure 2. Daily log return of 
prior and post-NSW bushfire.
Note: Prior shocks sample 
consists of 200-day return and 
post-shocks sample consists 
of 173-day return for NSW 
bushfire.
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October 2013 to 30 June 2014 for the NSW bushfire. We avoid disaster period for the excess fluctua-
tion of market return during that time due to semi-strong form market efficiency.
In Figure 1, prior Victoria bushfire, the daily log return fluctuates ranging from −8.71 to +5.63%, 
whereas after shocks, it fluctuates only in between ±3.5%. In Figure 2, the daily log return of the 
ASX300 varies in between −2.40 and +2.60% prior shocks and it swings ranging from −1.8 to +2.1% 
after shocks. Both these findings are clearly exhibiting less volatile distributional properties of the 
sample return after both catastrophes.
In Table 1, the variance of log return is exposed as a proxy of market volatility. After Victoria bush-
fire, the volatility in all markets declined, whereas after NSW bushfire, volatility remains the same in 
NZX, and declined in rest other countries. These findings also indicate low volatile episode of the 
daily market return after both catastrophes.
Tables 1–4 of Appendix 1 illustrate the descriptive statistics of the daily return of all market in-
dexes. Overall, the distributional properties of the base index (ASX200 and ASX300) returns are not 
normally distributed before bushfire, but after shocks, they are approximately normal. Before the 
bushfire, both series are negatively skewed {(−0.175) in ASX200 and (−0.266) in ASX300} indicating 
higher probability of return decrease and a potential volatility clustering in the daily market return. 
But surprisingly after both catastrophes, the skewness of both series is relatively less negative 
{−0.028 (ASX200) and −0.071 (ASX300)} indicating less volatile return distribution. After the Victoria 
bushfire, the daily mean return increased to 0.143 from −0.280% indicating the upward trend of 
Table 1. Variance of log return
Index Prior Victoria 
bushfire (%)
Post-Victoria 
bushfire (%)
Prior NSW 
bushfire (%)
Post-NSW 
bushfire (%)
ASX200 (Prior 
shocks)
0.052 0.016 0.007 0.004
NZX 0.020 0.007 0.003 0.003
BSE 0.094 0.042 0.013 0.007
HENGSENG 0.115 0.040 0.009 0.008
SSE 0.074 0.035 0.014 0.008
TSEC 0.053 0.022 0.006 0.003
NIKKE 0.104 0.026 0.032 0.017
Table 2. The coefficient of two-variable VAR model (Victoria bushfire)
Country
Prior Victoria bushfire Post-Victoria bushfire
ϕ1,1 (lag 4) ϕ1,2 (lag 4) εi ϕ1,1 (lag 4) ϕ1,2 (lag 4) εi
ASX200 0.0042 0.1279 −0.0026 −0.0373 0.1077 0.0016
NZ50 −0.0103 0.0099 −0.0014 0.0477 0.0016 0.0010
ASX200 −0.1435 −0.1612 −0.0040 −0.0207 0.03355 0.0015
BSE 0.1159 0.0639 −0.0022 −0.0205 0.0690 0.0029
ASX200 0.0485 0.0777 −0.0024 −0.0633 0.1739 0.0013
HENGSENG −0.1013 −0.0933 −0.0042 0.1238 −0.0714 0.0024
ASX200 0.0300 −0.1829 −0.0033 −0.0055 0.1152 0.0017
SSE 0.0164 0.0881 −0.0022 −0.0331 −0.0456 0.0014
ASX200 0.0589 −0.0898 −0.0030 −0.0024 −0.0451 0.0017
TSEC −0.1351 −0.0916 −0.0048 −0.0539 −0.0450 0.0030
ASX200 0.0603 0.1495 −0.0021 −0.0323 0.1024 0.0015
NIKKE −0.0043 −0.0310 −0.0036 0.1005 0.0893 0.0013
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ASX200 and after the NSW bushfire, it decreased to 0.005 from 0.056% directing downward trend of 
ASX300 return. skewness declined to around zero in HENGSENG (0.185) and TSEC (0.069) after the 
Victoria bushfire also verifies low volatile distributional properties of the sample return. After Victoria 
bushfire, skewness of BSE (1.960) and NIKKE (0.144) turns to positive indicating more positive daily 
return, whereas the skewness of SSE (−0.662) and NZX (−0.201) turns to negative confirming more 
negative return in those series. After the NSW bushfire, skewness of HENGSENG (−0.192) and NIIKKE 
(−0.297) increased and close to zero confirm less negative return fluctuations then prior shocks. On 
the other hands, the increased negative skewness of NZX (−0.341) and TSEC (−0.917) confirms more 
negative daily return fluctuation after the NSW bushfire. Skewness of BSE (0.440) and SSE (0.122) is 
positive after the NSW bushfire directing positive return fluctuations of the said indexes.
The kurtosis of both index returns (ASX200 and ASX300) is higher before both catastrophes repre-
senting leptokurtic distribution and after shocks, it is just around 3 (3.116 and 3.295) exhibiting ap-
proximately normal distribution of both samples. In other markets, after the Victoria bushfire, 
kurtosis declined to near 3 in HENGSENG (3.320), NIKKE (3.567), and NZX (3.125) suggesting an ap-
proximately normal distribution and increased in BSE (17.497), SSE (4.518), and TSEC (5.117) con-
firming no normal distribution. After the NSW bushfire, kurtosis declined in HENGSENG (3.669), NIKKE 
(3.325), and SSE (3.820) advocating approximately normal distribution, whereas it increased in NZX 
(6.075) and TSEC (4.789) recommending that distribution is not normal. The p-values of Jarque–Bera 
Table 3. The coefficient of two-variable VAR model (NSW bushfire)
Country 
Prior NSW bushfire Post-NSW bushfire
ϕ1,1 (lag 4) ϕ1,2 (lag 4) εi ϕ1,1 (lag 4) ϕ1,2 (lag 4) εi
ASX300 −0.0565 0.0037 0.0006 −0.0086 0.0941 −0.0000
NZX 0.0527 −0.0820 0.0007 −0.0323 −0.0197 0.0003
ASX300 −0.0627 0.0267 0.0006 −0.0843 −0.0148 0.0013
BSE −0.0660 −0.1123 0.0003 −0.0174 −0.0024 0.0000
ASX300 −0.0373 0.1600 0.0006 −0.0036 0.0052 0.0000
HENGSENG 0.1547 −0.0327 −0.0000 0.0307 0.0347 0.0001
ASX300 −0.0344 −0.0809 0.0006 −0.0048 0.0451 0.0000
SSE 0.1820 −0.0547 −0.0002 0.0222 0.0792 −0.0002
ASX300 −0.0582 0.1322 0.0006 −0.0141 0.1004 −0.0000
TSEC 0.1191 −0.0082 0.0003 0.1500 −0.0756 0.0007
ASX300 −0.0673 0.0454 0.0006 −0.0026 −0.0011 0.0000
NIKKE 0.2736 −0.0925 0.0015 0.0611 −0.1006 0.0005
Table 4. Unadjusted (conditional) correlation coefficient of ASX200 residuals with other 
markets (Victoria bushfire)
Country 흆u
post shock
 
(conditional) 
Victoria bushfire 
(%)
흆
u
prior shock
 
(conditional) 
Victoria bushfire 
(%)
(z) p-value (two 
tailed)
Contagion
New Zealand (NZX) 24.31 40.98 −1.84 0.07 No
India (BSE) 9.33 −13.59 2.26 0.02 Yes
HENGSENG 14.75 −1.41 1.6 0.11 No
SSE 8.66 −3.54 1.2 0.23 No
TSEC 13.34 11.55 0.18 0.86 No
NIKKE 9.18 −5.27 1.42 0.16 No
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test statistics expose the similar results of skewness and kurtosis about the normality distribution of 
the sample return. Prior to the both catastrophes, the Jarque–Bera test statistics (p < 0.05) reject the 
normality assumption of both samples’ (ASX200 and 300) return; but after shocks, (p > 0.05) it is 
confirmed that the return of both indexes is normally distributed. However, in other indexes, after 
the Victoria shock, the Jarque–Bera test statistics (p > 0.05) of in the HENGSENG, NIKKE, and NZX 
indexes and after the NSW shock, it is confirmed that returns are normality distributed in HENGSENG, 
NIKKE, and SSE indexes with (p > 0.05).
To measure contagion, we use unconditional correlation coefficient developed by Forbes and 
Rigobon (2002). Using the unrestricted two-variable vector autoregressive (VAR) model, we calculate 
each index return with ASX200 and ASX300, respectively. The VAR model is widely accepted in 
checking the dynamic behavior of financial time series data. We could use multivariate VAR model 
for capturing the overall dependencies of each market with others, but to measure the distinctive 
extent of correlation, we use the following two-variable VAR model.
 
 
where y1 represents ASX return in each pair and y2 the other market return. Both y1 and y2 are endog-
enous variables and ε1 and ε2 are the residuals/white noise disturbance terms of the equations and 
also the key components of our analysis. We select four lags (k = 4) for avoiding autocorrelation in 
the data-set.
Our intention is to measure the impact of idiosyncratic shocks of one market to other market. So 
we calculate the daily white noise disturbance term of each market in both periods. According to OLS 
estimator, 
∑
휀
i
= 0, implies each value of εi represents the unique reflection of the shock. Now let 
the residuals (ε1) of the shocks generating data-set of ASX be x and the other (ε2) be y. Next, we di-
vide the sample (x) into two groups, prior shocks sample denoted as xprior and post-shocks sample 
denoted as xpost and likewise for other markets, yprior and ypost. According to Forbes and Rigibon (2001), 
after shocks, it is expected that market volatility will increase and if so, then,
 
This signifies any increase in the post-shocks correlation does not constitute contagion always be-
cause it is expected that after shocks, variance of x will increase due to potential increase in market 
volatility; consequently, the covariance of x and y will also increase. This subsequently increases the 
post-shock (unadjusted) correlation coefficient (휌post
xy
).
The Equation (6) below describes the unadjusted correlation coefficient.
 
where 휌u
t
 is the unadjusted (conditional) correlation coefficient and ρt is the correlation of the VAR 
residuals. After shocks, any increase in correlation coefficients up to (훿
x
) is not contagion, rather a 
(1)y1, t = c1 + �1, 1y1, t−k + �1, 2 y2, t−k + 휀1, t
(2)y2, t = c2 + �2, 1y1, t−k + �2, 2 y2, t−k + 휀2, t
(3)𝜎postxx > 𝜎
prior
xx
(4)and, 𝜎postxy > 𝜎
prior
xy
(5)therefore, 𝜌postxy > 𝜌
prior
xy
(6)휌ut = 휌t
√
1 + 훿
t
1 + 훿
t휌2
t
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conditional bias (conditional to the variance of x). In that case, correlations are not adjusted with 훿
x
 
(Forbes & Rigobon, 2002). The relative extent of biases can be calculated as,
 
where 훿
x
 is the heteroskcedasticity bias persistent in a time series data due to earlier shock. They 
also suggested for contagion, a significant increase in the unconditional (adjusted by 훿
t
) correlation 
of the two time series data is required after any shocks. The unconditional (adjusted) correlation 
coefficient is,
Finally, Fishers r to z transformation is used for examining the significance of difference between two 
independent samples’ correlation. If z > 1.96 for a two-tailed test and p ≤ 0.05, contagion exists; 
otherwise, this is economic linkage. If the post-shocks correlation coefficient between x and y is 
more than prior shocks, z should be positive, and contagion will take place at z ≥ +1.96. In that case, 
volatility will transmit from Australia to other country. And if the post-shocks correlation coefficient 
between two residuals is less than prior shocks, z should be negative which suggests economic link-
age declined and if z ≤ −1.96, economic linkage declined extensively. If the post-shocks correlation 
of the VAR residuals is positive and increases, but not significantly (z lies in between 0 and < +1.96), 
a high economic linkage is persistent. And if after shocks correlation coefficient is negative between 
two residuals and decreases, but not significantly (z lies between 0 and >−1.96), a low economic 
linkage is persistent.
4. Findings and analysis
Tables 2 and 3 exhibit the coefficient of two-variable vector autoregression (VAR) model. We calcu-
late two-variable VAR models where ASX200 and ASX300 are the dependent variables (y1) with re-
spect to other country (y2). In Table 2, after Victoria bushfire, the coefficient of ASX200 lag return has 
full negative impact on the current market return of ASX200 but prior shocks, it has a positive impact 
on the current market return of ASX200 except with BSE (−0.1435). This is a good signal of persisting 
low return dynamics in the ASX200 after shocks. Besides, prior Victoria bushfire, ASX200 lag return 
has a negative impact on all other countries’ return except BSE (0.1158) and SSE (0.0164), while after 
shocks, it has a negative impact on BSE (−0.0205), SSE (−0.0330), and TSECs (−0.0539) return only. 
Apart from this, BSE (−0.1612), SSE (−0.1829), and TSEC (−0.08978) have negative impacts on the 
ASX200 return before the Victoria bushfire, whereas after shocks, only TSEC has a negative impact 
(−0.04508) on ASX200 return.
(7)훿x ≡
휎
post
x, x
휎
prior
x, x
− 1
(8)휌
a
t
=
휌
u
t√
1 + 훿
t
[1 −
(
휌
u
t
)2
]
Table 5. Adjusted (unconditional) correlation coefficient of ASX200 residuals with other 
markets (Victoria bushfire)
Country 흆a
post shock
 
(unconditional) 
Victoria bushfire 
(%)
흆
a
prior shock
 
(unconditional) 
Victoria bushfire 
(%)
(z) p-value (two 
tailed)
Contagion
New Zealand (NZX) 31.99 51.77 −2.38 0.02 No
India (BSE) 12.52 −18.17 3.04 0.00 Yes
HENGSENG 19.69 −1.89 2.15 0.03 Yes
SSE 11.63 −4.76 1.62 0.11 No
TSEC 17.84 15.47 0.24 0.81 No
NIKKE 12.33 −7.10 1.92 0.06 No
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Error term is positive in all equations after the Victoria bushfire and is fully negative before Victoria 
bushfire. This implies actual daily returns of all markets are comparatively low before the Victoria 
bushfire and high after shocks. Since, after shocks ε2 increased in all countries, it indicates a potential 
positive z score. However, if the post-shocks correlation of ASX200 with any other country is less 
than prior shocks, the z score will be negative.
In Table 3, the coefficient of ASX300 lag return has a negative impact on the current market return 
of ASX300 both prior and post-NSW bushfire. Apart from this, prior to the NSW bushfire, ASX300 lag 
return has a positive impact on all other countries’ return except BSE (−066); and after shocks, it has 
a negative impact on NZX (−0.0323) and BSE (−0.0174) only. Besides, NZX, BSE, TSEC, and NIKKE’s lag 
return has negative impact on their own current market returns after the NSW bushfire. This implies 
after shocks return of those indexes will decline.
The error term of all markets return is positive after the NSW bushfire except SSE (−0.0002) direct-
ing the higher actual return then estimated. In addition to this, error term only increased in 
HENGSENG (0.0001) and TSEC (0.0007) implying more actual return in these two markets. In other 
indexes (NZX, BSE, and NIKKE), error terms are less after shocks suggesting low actual daily return 
after the NSW bushfire.
Tables 4–7 exhibit the results of the study. In Table 4, the unadjusted correlation coefficient of the 
residuals of ASX200 with NZX declined to 24.31% and their z = −1.84 with (p > .05) confirms no con-
tagion, rather a low economic linkage between Australia and New Zealand. And after heteroscedas-
ticity adjustment, z = −2.38 with (p < .05) exposed economic linkage declined significantly after the 
Victoria bushfire. Besides, negative skewness, kurtosis value around 3 (3.125), and the variance of 
return declined from 0.020% to 0.007% in Table 1 also verify low volatile return distribution of New 
Zealand capital market after the Victoria bushfire.
Table 6. Unadjusted (conditional) correlation coefficient of ASX300 residuals with other 
markets (NSW bushfire)
Country 흆u
post shock
 
(conditional) 
NSW bushfire (%)
흆
u
prior shock
 
(conditional) 
NSW bushfire (%)
(z) p-value (two 
tailed)
Contagion
New Zealand (NZX) 6.62 10.90 −0.41 0.68 No
India (BSE) 1.92 15.46 −1.3 0.19 No
HENGSENG 11.48 −8.56 1.92 0.05 Yes
SSE 3.84 16.71 −1.24 0.22 No
TSEC 9.50 1.27 0.79 0.43 No
NIKKE −0.75 11.46 −1.17 0.24 No
Table 7. Adjusted (unconditional) correlation coefficient of ASX300 residuals with other 
markets (NSW bushfire)
Country 흆a
post shock
 
(unconditional) 
NSW bushfire (%)
흆
a
prior shock
 
(unconditional) 
NSW bushfire (%)
(z) p-value (two 
tailed)
Contagion
New Zealand (NZX) 7.46 12.27 −0.46 0.65 No
India (BSE) 2.16 17.37 −1.47 0.14 No
HENGSENG 12.91 −9.64 2.16 0.03 Yes
SSE 4.32 18.76 −1.4 0.16 No
TSEC 10.69 1.43 0.89 0.37 No
NIKKE −0.85 12.89 −1.32 0.19 No
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Both unadjusted (9.33%) and adjusted (12.52%) correlation coefficients of the residuals of ASX200 
and BSE increased significantly after shocks with z = 2.26 and 3.04, respectively, and (p < 0.05) vali-
date contagion in both cases. This entails, after shocks, higher percentage of volatility has transmit-
ted from the Australian capital market to the Indian capital market. The unadjusted correlation 
coefficient of ASX200 and HENGSENG increased after shocks but the z = 1.6 with (p > 0.05) suggests 
higher economic linkage between Australia and Hong Kong. However, after heteroscedasticity ad-
justment, z = 2.15 with (p < 0.05) confirms contagion. The adjusted correlation coefficient of NIKKE 
is positive after shocks (12.33%) and the z = 1.92 with (p = 0.06) suggests high economic linkage and 
also affirms that if there is further increase in correlations, contagion will take place.
The findings of BSE, HENGSENG, and NIKKE are contradictory with their return volatility displayed 
in Table 1, where prior to the Victoria bushfire, the volatility of ASX200, BSE, HENGSENG, and NIKKEs 
is 0.052, 0.094, 0.115, and 0.104%, respectively, whereas after shocks, these are 0.016, 0.042, 0.040, 
and 0.026%. In all markets, volatility declined according to the Table 1, but increased according to 
the adjusted correlation coefficient. These contradictory findings produce a confusion in deciding 
whether volatility is transmitted from Australia to those countries or not? The logical explanation of 
this conflict is that though volatility level declined after shocks in the above markets which is also 
verified from their kurtosis results, the percentage of volatility transmission increased after shocks 
rather than few big fluctuation transmissions. The adjusted correlation coefficient of SSE increased 
after the Victoria bushfire and their corresponding z = 1.62 with (p > 0.05) confirms high economic 
linkage between Australia and China and the findings of TSEC suggest a moderate increase in eco-
nomic linkage between Australia and Taiwan.
In Tables 6 and 7, both unadjusted (휌u
t
= 11.47%) and adjusted (휌a
t
= 12.91%) correlation coef-
ficient of ASX300 with HENGSENG increased significantly after the NSW bushfire. The z value of ad-
justed correlation coefficient is 2.16 and with corresponding (p < 0.05) confirms contagion. This 
implies higher percentage of volatility has transmitted from the Australian capital market to the 
Hong Kong capital market after the NSW bushfire. But these results are also contradictory with Table 
1 again, where the volatility of HENGSENG (0.008%) declined slightly after the NSW bushfire and the 
respective skewness (−0.192) and kurtosis (3.669) also declined suggesting low volatile distribu-
tional properties of the Hong Kong return. The explanation of this conflict is the same as before: the 
rate of volatility transmission has increased from the Australian capital market to the Hong Kong 
capital market rather than a small number of gigantic fluctuation transmissions in HENGSENG 
return.
In other markets, (p > 0.05) of adjusted correlation coefficient confirms no contagion, rather vary-
ing degrees of economic linkage after NSW bushfire. The after shocks-adjusted correlation coeffi-
cient of ASX300 with NZX (7.46%), BSE (2.16%), and SSE (4.32%) increased but not significantly and 
their corresponding z score is −0.46, −1.47, and −1.4 pointing out no contagion between Australia 
and these countries. Apart from this, the volatility level remains the same prior and post-shocks in 
these countries and the mean return of NZX and SSE declined after shocks again signaling the less 
volatile return distribution in those markets.
The after shocks correlation of ASX300 and NIKKE (−0.008%) and the z = −1.32 with (p > 0.05) 
confirms persistence of no contagion between the Australian and Japanese capital markets. Only 
TSEC’s adjusted correlation coefficient increased significantly (10.69%) after the NSW bushfire indi-
cating the probability of higher percentage of volatility transmission from Australia to Taiwan. But 
since the z < 1.96 (0.89) and the corresponding (p > 0.05), we cannot verify its contagion; rather, it 
might be a high economic linkage.
5. Conclusion
This study has quantified the long-term influence of bushfire on the Australian capital market as well 
as the contagion effect of the Australian catastrophe on other countries’ capital market. For doing 
this, firstly, we have divided the data-set into two groups, prior shocks return and post-shocks return. 
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The variance of logarithmic return stands for the market volatility in our study. Interestingly, primary 
findings verify that all markets experienced low volatility after both catastrophes except New 
Zealand. However, the volatility levels remain the same in New Zealand after the NSW bushfire. This 
implies that the provided shocks of catastrophic disasters do not increase the market volatility of 
any countries. Furthermore, we examined the contagion effect of the said disasters on other coun-
tries’ capital market. In that case, we mainly test the impulse response of idiosyncratic shocks at-
tributed in the daily market return using the adjusted correlation coefficient of the VAR residuals. 
Our findings suggest that correlations exert a higher percentage of volatility transmission in the 
Indian and Hong Kong capital markets due to the Victoria bushfire. And after the NSW bushfire, a 
higher percentage of volatility has transmitted from Australia to Hong Kong only. These findings 
conclude that the capital markets of India and Hong Kong are quite sensitive to the Australian ca-
tastrophes. So the investors of these two countries need to keep keen eyes on the Australian disas-
ters before taking any investment decision.
It was believed earlier that in the long run environmental catastrophes directly affect the coun-
try’s GDP only, but the existing literature and this study suggest that catastrophes also directly affect 
the capital market of a country, and due to globalization, these influences can transmit quickly in 
other markets. It is impossible to stop the catastrophe and even it is very hard to control the effects 
of disasters on the economy. However, more precise loss estimation, accurate economic and finan-
cial influence measurement, and appropriate policy formulation for controlling the adverse effects 
of catastrophes can ensure the stable capital market.
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Appendix 1
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the daily log return series, prior Victoria bushfire
ASX200 BSE HENGSENG NIKKE NZX SSE TSEC
Mean −0.280% −0.318% −0.363% −0.339% −0.139% −0.264% −0.395%
Median −0.229% −0.296% −0.145% −0.143% −0.048% −0.338% −0.202%
Maximum 5.628% 7.901% 13.407% 13.235% 5.815% 9.034% 6.099%
Minimum −8.704% −11.604% −13.582% −12.111% −4.938% −8.044% −5.933%
Std. dev. 2.288% 3.061% 3.397% 3.229% 1.427% 2.722% 2.298%
Skewness −0.175 −0.071 0.379 −0.136 −0.109 0.264 0.142
Kurtosis 3.995 3.540 6.243 6.220 5.065 4.006 3.262
Jarque–Bera 8.110 2.274 80.865 76.147 31.429 9.424 1.092
Probability 0.017 0.321 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.579
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the daily log return series, post-Victoria bushfire
ASX200 BSE HENGSENG NIKKE NZX SSE TSEC
Mean 0.143% 0.277% 0.213% 0.137% 0.084% 0.124% 0.255%
Median 0.096% 0.181% 0.105% 0.168% 0.119% 0.290% 0.298%
Maximum 3.409% 15.990% 7.153% 5.026% 2.374% 5.936% 6.525%
Minimum −3.502% −6.008% −4.965% −4.637% −2.595% −6.983% −4.115%
Std. dev. 1.261% 2.059% 1.995% 1.607% 0.859% 1.880% 1.470%
Skewness −0.028 1.960 0.185 0.144 −0.201 −0.662 0.069
Kurtosis 3.116 17.497 3.320 3.567 3.125 4.518 5.117
Jarque–Bera 0.154 2,095.456 2.222 3.756 1.642 37.712 41.806
Probability 0.926 0.000 0.329 0.153 0.440 0.000 0.000
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the daily log return of ASX300, prior NSW bushfire
ASX300 BSE HENGSENG NIKKE NZX SSE TSEC
Mean 0.056% 0.020% 0.001% 0.148% 0.068% −0.012% 0.035%
Median 0.098% 0.050% 0.000% 0.178% 0.081% 0.009% 0.010%
Maximum 2.592% 3.704% 2.517% 4.826% 1.707% 3.333% 2.237%
Minimum −2.354% −4.054% −2.920% −7.597% −1.409% −5.445% −2.416%
Std. dev. 0.815% 1.129% 0.972% 1.784% 0.545% 1.163% 0.756%
Skewness −0.266 −0.179 −0.259 −0.756 −0.081 −0.514 −0.106
Kurtosis 3.701 4.482 3.857 5.110 3.508 5.951 3.601
Jarque–Bera 6.412 19.284 8.318 55.889 2.354 80.940 3.363
Probability 0.041 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.308 0.000 0.186
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the daily log return of ASX300, post-NSW bushfire
ASX300 BSE HENGSENG NIKKE NZX SSE TSEC
Mean 0.005% 0.112% −0.006% 0.018% 0.027% −0.051% 0.060%
Median 0.010% 0.060% 0.008% 0.015% 0.009% −0.065% 0.131%
Maximum 2.061% 2.868% 2.690% 3.080% 1.995% 2.834% 1.203%
Minimum −1.766% −2.037% −2.936% −4.267% −2.265% −2.901% −2.369%
Std. dev. 0.642% 0.837% 0.888% 1.318% 0.506% 0.904% 0.572%
Skewness −0.071 0.440 −0.192 −0.297 −0.341 0.122 −0.917
Kurtosis 3.295 3.491 3.669 3.325 6.075 3.820 4.789
Jarque–Bera 0.766 7.275 4.256 3.276 71.120 5.248 47.058
Probability 0.682 0.026 0.119 0.194 0.000 0.073 0.000
